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Abstract 
The European Agenda on Migration presented by the European Commission (on 13 May 2015) among 
its key actions related to the fourth pillar – a new policy on legal migration – suggests the 
“modernisation and overhaul of the Blue Card scheme”. The weakness of the Blue Card in its current 
form as a tool to attract and retain talents in Europe is acknowledged and the need for reform is 
reconfirmed. On 6 June 2016 the European Commission presented a new Proposal (for a directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly-skilled employment). This study aims at presenting the Blue Cards 
in terms of its achievements, its prospects with the proposed reforms and gaps that will remain 
unaddressed after revision 
Keywords 
Labour migration, high-skilled, Blue Card, EU, labour market. 
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The reform of the Blue Card Directive: status and prospects  
Objectives of the Blue Card Directive 
Attracting and retaining talents is away for Europe to maintain and increase its competitiveness in the 
near future by boosting the economic growth and by addressing labour-market shortages related to an 
aging population and the rapidly changing skill composition of labour demand. The adoption of the 
Blue Card Directive by the Council of Europe in 2009 was the first attempt to develop a framework 
for attracting highly-qualified third-country nationals, facilitating their admission and mobility across 
the EU. The Directive aimed at fulfilling/contributing to the ambitious goal of “becoming the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion by 2010” announced at the Lisbon 
European Council in March 2000.  
Figure 1 and 2 below provide two sets of information on the presence of highly-skilled migrants in 
selected EU countries and alternative non-EU destinations. With the exception of UK and Ireland 
(50%) the rest of European countries presented currently have a stock of foreign-born population 
which is relatively less educated (30%) than other traditional destinations. The difference is even more 
striking once we look at the share of highly-skilled migrants as a part of the total working age 
population. In Canada the tertiary educated foreign born constitute almost one fifth of the total 
working age population, while in European countries it constitutes a measly 3.6 percent.  
Figure 1. The highly-skilled among migrant population (%) 
 
Source: The IAB brain-drain data. Available at: http://www.iab.de/en/daten/iab-brain-drain-data.aspx. 
Note: Presented information refers to 2010 
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Figure 2 Highly-skilled migrants among total working age population (%) 
 
Source: The IAB brain-drain data. Available at: http://www.iab.de/en/daten/iab-brain-drain-data.aspx 
Note: Presented information refers to 2010. 
The potential of highly skilled migrants in boosting competitiveness and economic growth in the 
destination and so far relatively disadvantageous position of European countries in attracting them 
explains the efforts put in at the European level to develop an effective mechanism enabling EU 
countries to attract and to retain talents over the last decade. 
The European Commission Proposal to the Council from 2007 indicated two global objectives 
which were also later reflected in the Directive
1
: 
(i) to improve EU ability to attract and retain third-country high skilled workers as one of the 
conditions for increasing the contribution of economic immigration within the set of policies and 
measures aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of the EU economy and addressing the 
consequences of demographic ageing; 
(ii) to effectively and promptly respond to existing and new demands for highly-qualified labour, 
and to offset skill shortages, by enhancing the inflows and circulation of third-country highly-
skilled workers between jobs and Member States and by promoting their efficient allocation and 
re-allocation on the EU labour market
2
. 
Despite the ambitious objectives in the initial proposal the adopted Directive was a result of a series of 
compromises. The high level of flexibility given to Member States in the transposition of the Directive 
into national legislation led to the creation of “national” Blue Cards and added to a series of existing 
national schemes. Hence, it reinforced the heterogeneity of schemes across member states rather than 
leading to harmonisation. Also, the Blue Card eligibility criteria were almost impossible to reach for 
potential employees, while employers were reluctant to go through complicated bureaucratic 
procedures to issue one. “Actually, many of the provisions of the Blue Card Directive, and the way 
transposition into national legislations was conceived, are geared to restricting the number of 
beneficiaries rather than to facilitating the matching between EU labour demand and international 
                                                     
1
 Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of 
highly-qualified employment on October 23, 2007 (COM (2007) 637 final). Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0637:FIN:EN:PDF 
2
 See the comparison of specific objectives in the impact assessment reports in 2007 and 2016 in Table 1. 
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skilled workers. As such, they tend to discourage talented workers rather than attracting them, in 
particular if these workers have alternatives.” (Kalantaryan and Martin, 2015). 
The fact that three years after the transposition of the Directive (due to 19 June, 2011) into national 
legislation only 13,865 (compared to 572,414 first residence permits for remunerated activities) Blue 
Cards were issued in the whole EU in a single year (2014) speaks to the weakness of the framework in 
attracting highly-skilled foreign workers
3
. By 2016, the total number of Blue Cards issued reached 
20,979 out of which only 8996 were first permits indicating that the frameworks currently serves more 
as a tool to retain talents than to attract them (see Figure 3). The vast majority of the Blue Cards 
(almost 90 % in 2014 and 85 % in 2016) were issued in Germany due to absence of national scheme. 
The rest of the member states issued from a few to a few hundred. The national schemes though seem 
more successful in attracting the highly-skilled still leave the number of beneficiaries bellow the 
desired level. The number of permits issued annually under the national schemes (for highly qualified 
employment) hardly exceeds 30,000 for EU 28 and 25,000 for EU 25 (member states bound by the 
Blue Card Directive) per year
4
. These modest figures indicate that, currently the EU member states do 
not manage to attract enough highly–skilled workers to enhance the innovative potential of the EU or 
to combat skill shortages either under national schemes or under the Blue Card scheme. This simple 
fact cries out for immediate reforms at EU level. 
Figure 3 EU Blue Cards by type of decision 
 
Source: Eurostat, EU Blue Cards by type of decision, occupation and citizenship [migr_resbc1] and First permits 
issued for remunerated activities by reason, length of validity and citizenship [migr_resocc] 
The shortcomings of the current EU Blue Card, both concerning its weak performance in terms of 
admissions and limited facilitation of intra-EU mobility for its beneficiaries, were acknowledged by 
both the European Commission in its Implementation Report
5
 and by the academic community 
(OECD and EU, 2016; Kalantaryan and Martin, 2015; Martin and Venturini, 2015; Eisele, 2013; 
                                                     
3
 Eurostat, EU Blue Cards by type of decision, occupation and citizenship [migr_resbc1] 
4
 For comparison, though the US has a significantly smaller labour force than the EU the number of H-1B petitions 
approved in the US is 315,857(out of which 162,239 are initial) Report on H-1B Petitions. Available at: 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies 
/H-1B/H-1B-FY-2015-Petitions.pdf . 
5
 Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment (COM (2014) 
287). May 22, 2014. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency /regdoc /rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-287-EN-F1-1.Pdf 
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Expert Group on Economic Migration Discussion, 2015). The most frequently pointed out problems 
can be summarised as following. 
 Poor performance in terms of number of admissions; 
 Lack of potential to retain and attract graduates;  
 Wide discretion in term of implementation (as a result of the high level of flexibility given to 
Member States in the transposition of the Directive into national legislation); 
 Existence of parallel national schemes for highly-qualified TCN workers (that potentially 
compete with the Blue Card and create more confusion for stakeholders); 
 Limited access for small and medium enterprises to the scheme; 
 Absence of a framework enabling the smooth recognition of foreign qualifications (that 
decreases the pool of potential beneficiaries); 
 Lack of potential for intra-EU mobility; 
 Lengthy bureaucratic procedure; 
 Excessively high eligibility standards; 
 Modest set rights for the beneficiary and her/his family members. 
The European Commission Proposal  
The intention to reform the EU Blue Card was indicated in the European Agenda on Migration
6
 (May 
22, 2015) and in the Commission’s recent Communication7 (April 6, 2016). The European 
Commission Proposal
8
 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly-skilled employment 
(thereafter the Proposal) (June 6, 2016) has several aims. It wishes to reform the existing Blue Card 
into a significantly more inclusive scheme that can provide a transparent, flexible and streamlined 
scheme for highly-skilled foreign workers and by “acting as a single player towards the outside world” 
compete with schemes offered by other destinations. The objective of the proposal is “to improve the 
EU’s ability to effectively and promptly respond to existing and arising demands for highly skilled 
third-country nationals, and to offset skill shortages, in order to increase the contribution of economic 
immigration to enhancing the competitiveness of the EU economy and addressing the consequences of 
demographic ageing”. 
                                                     
6
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. European Agenda on Migration (COM(2015) 240) May 1, 2015 Available 
at:  
 https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/News/2017_communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf  
7
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “Towards a reform of the common 
European asylum system and enhancing legal avenues to Europe” (COM(2016) 197 final) April 6, 2016. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160406 
/towards_a_reform_of_the_common_european_asylum_system_and_enhancing_legal_avenues_to_europe_-
_20160406_en.pdf 
8
 Proposal or a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment COM(2016) 378 final. (June 6, 2016). Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160607 /directive_conditions_entry_residence_third-
country_nationals_highly_skilled_employment_en.pdf 
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General and specific policy objectives identified in the Impact Assessment report 
The Impact Assessment of the Proposal considered two challenges requiring actions: (i) EU failure to 
attract and retain third-country highly-skilled workers and (ii) the EU failure in admitting other 
talented and highly-skilled TCNs. The first problem area includes widely-discussed issues related to 
the incapacity of the Blue Card in meeting its primary objective of attracting and retaining talents 
including recent graduates and former researchers. Instead, the second problem area is more 
innovative; the lack of a legal framework enabling admission of “other” highly-skilled TCN 
(innovative TCN entrepreneur, TCN service providers) and the waste of skills and human capital with 
highly-skilled beneficiaries of international protection and asylum applicants. The Proposal mainly 
addresses the first problem area and considers the inclusion of beneficiaries of international protection 
only. 
With the exception of small adjustments related to the inclusion of entrepreneurial activities as an 
element of occupational mobility the general policy objectives identified in the 2016 Impact 
assessment are in line with the global objectives in the Impact assessment from 2007. Instead, there 
are more significant changes in the specific policy objectives (see the comparison in Table 1):  
 the specific policy objective (1) includes “effective and efficient” term while defining the need 
to create a common EU migration system for highly-skilled TCNs (stressing the failure of the 
current version of the Blue Cards to do this); 
 the specific policy objective (3) in addition to the already specified simplification and 
harmonisation of admission procedure, includes “lowering barriers to enter”; 
 the specific policy objective (4) underlines the importance of the rights given to beneficiaries 
and family members in terms of labour-market integration and favourable condition for 
residence;  
 the specific policy objective (5) introduces the need to “ensure more flexible” admission 
conditions;  
 the specific policy objective (6) was not present in the previous version and it refers to the: 
“further development of the EU Blue Card brand in orders to improve the image of the EU as an 
attractive destination”. 
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Table 1 Global and specific policy objective identified in Impact assessments reports 2007 vs 
2016 
2007 2016 
The global/general objectives 
(1) to improve EU ability to attract and retain third-
country HSW as one of the conditions for increasing 
the contribution of economic immigration within the 
set of policies and measures aimed at enhancing the 
competitiveness of the EU economy and addressing 
the consequences of demographic ageing; 
(1) to improve the EU’s ability to attract and retain 
highly skilled third-country nationals in order to 
increase the contribution of economic immigration to 
the policies and measures aimed at enhancing the 
competitiveness of the EU economy and at addressing 
the consequences of demographic ageing;  
(2) to effectively and promptly respond to existing and 
arising demands for highly qualified labour, and to 
offset skill shortages, by enhancing the inflows and 
circulation of third-countries HSW between jobs and 
Member States and promoting their efficient allocation 
and re-allocation on the EU labour market 
(2) to improve the EU’s ability to effectively and 
promptly respond to existing and arising demands for 
highly skilled third-country nationals, and to offset 
skill shortages, by enhancing the inflows and 
circulation of highly skilled third-country nationals 
between jobs and entrepreneurial activities 
(occupational mobility) and between regions and 
Member States (geographical intra-EU mobility), and 
promoting their efficient allocation and re-allocation 
on the EU labour market. 
The specific objectives 
(1) to develop a coherent approach and common 
immigration policy on third-country HSW; 
(1) to create a coherent, effective and efficient 
common EU immigration system for highly skilled 
third-country nationals;  
(2) to increase the numbers of third-country HSW 
immigrating to the EU on a needs based approach;  
(2) to increase the numbers of highly skilled third-
country nationals immigrating to the EU on a needs-
based approach;  
(3) to simplify and harmonize admission procedures 
for third-country HSW;  
(3) to lower barriers to entry, simplify and harmonise 
the admission procedures for highly skilled third-
country nationals, without prejudice to EU nationals;  
(4) to promote third-country HSW's social and 
economic integration; 
(4) to promote the social and economic integration of 
highly skilled third-country nationals and their family 
members, including labour market integration, by 
granting them favourable conditions of residence 
and rights; 
(5) to foster intra-EU mobility, remove unnecessary 
barriers and allow a more efficient allocation of third 
country HSW through the EU. 
(5) to ensure more flexible possibilities for intra-EU 
mobility, remove unnecessary barriers and allow a 
more efficient allocation of highly skilled third-
country nationals through the EU;  
 (6) To ensure the further development of the ‘EU 
Blue Card’ brand in order to improve the image of 
the EU as an attractive destination.  
Note: New elements or changes with respect to 2007 are underlined. HSW stands for high skilled workers. 
Taking into account the general and specific objectives identified the Impact assessment provides an 
extensive analysis of a set policy options packages (POP) and policy options (PO) based on the 
following criteria: 
 relevance and effectiveness in achieving objectives; 
 expected impacts (economic, social and in terms of international relations); 
 efficiency; 
 coherence with other EU policies; 
 stakeholders’ and experts’ views.  
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Based on these criteria the preferred option was identified: POP(2a) in combination with the horizontal 
non-legislative option PO(a). In addition, the Impact assessment report points to PO(c) regarding the 
legislative action extending the EU Blue Card to highly-skilled beneficiaries of international 
protection and asylum applicants (See Box 1). Despite the limited economic impact, the option is 
considered promising due to its social impact and political desirability. It is suggested to consider 
including this option limiting it only to beneficiaries of international protection (see Box 1 for the 
whole set of options considered or discarded). The European Commission followed the 
recommendations of the Impact assessment report derived from the Proposal based on the preferred 
policy options: making the EU Blue Card accessible to a wider group of highly-skilled workers in 
combination with non-legislative actions to improve the effectiveness of the EU Blue Card, while 
extending the Blue Card to highly-skilled beneficiaries of international protection. The Proposal states 
that the reformed Blue Card is estimated to attract from 32,484 to 137,690 highly-skilled workers 
(instead of the current 13,862 in 2014) with an annual positive impact of between 1.4 to 6.2 billion 
euros. 
Box 1 Set of Legislative and horizontal/parallel legislative options considered in the Impact 
assessment report.  
Options discarded 
 Repealing the Blue Card Directive 
 Introduction of a point-based expression of interest system 
 Extending the Blue Card to cover skilled international service providers 
Options retained for in-depth assessment 
Legislative options 
 POP(0) Baseline scenario 
 POP(1) Extending the scope by making it accessible to a significantly wider group of workers, 
including (some) medium-skilled 
 POP2 Modifying admission conditions and rights without extending the scope beyond highly-
skilled workers 
o POP(2a) Making the EU Blue Card accessible to a wider group of highly-skilled workers 
(preferred) 
o POP(2b) Making the EU Blue Card a tool to attract a selected group of the most highly-
skilled workers 
o POP(2c) Creating a two-tiered Blue Card targeted at different skill levels of highly-skilled 
workers 
 POP(3) A unified standard EU-wide Blue Card 
Horizontal/parallel legislative options 
 PO(a) Non-legislative actions to improve the effectiveness of the EU Blue Card (preferred) 
 PO(b) Legislative action extending the EU Blue Card to innovative entrepreneurs 
 PO(c) Legislative action extending the EU Blue Card to highly-skilled beneficiaries of 
international protection and asylum applicants (included in the Proposal) 
Shortcomings addressed  
The shortcomings of the Blue Card Directives have been widely acknowledged both in the 
academic literature and by the European Commission itself. Though, the Proposal addresses 
the majority of the issues raised, it can be considered as “marking time” rather than “step 
ahead”; the set of reforms proposed is another attempt to reach the objectives identified in the 
2007 Proposal. The following discussion presents the way the current Proposal can potentially 
(if approved as it is) address the weaknesses demonstrated by the current Blue Card 
demonstrated and the remaining gaps. Table 2 summarises the measures proposed to address 
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different shortcomings of the Blue Card by the academic community, the European 
Parliament and the European commission (the Proposal). 
Reducing the level of heterogeneity 
One of the crucial shortcomings of the Blue Card mentioned in the Implementation Report was the 
lack of harmonisation. This, according to the study, is caused both by the existence of parallel national 
schemes, and by wide discretion in implementation of the Directive by Member States. The former 
one is also seen as an obstacle for intra-EU mobility of highly-skilled third country national. In 
particular, the Proposal states the parallel national schemes “cannot offer, by their own nature, this 
possibility to move easily from one Member State to another should labour shortages or work 
opportunities arise”. The Proposal suggests establishing a single EU-wide scheme by replacing 
parallel national schemes directly competing with the Blue Card (COM(2016) 378). All the national 
schemes competing with the EU Blue Card in attracting highly-skilled workers would, then, be 
abolished. However, the ending of national schemes is reasonable only after the reformed Blue Card 
proves their irrelevance or inferiority. While the lack of harmonisation does, indeed, undermine the 
effectiveness of the Blue Card in terms of admissions and intra-EU mobility, the negative impact of 
the national schemes is overrated. “It might be assumed that the existence of numerous national 
schemes would lead to confusion among potential employers or migrant employees. However, 
national schemes might be more flexible and dynamic in meeting the needs of national labour markets. 
If the objective is to develop a flexible system that is responsive to national and EU labour market 
needs as they emerge, the coexistence of several systems is not detrimental to the overall objective. 
Economic actors will seek in each case the scheme best adapted to their needs.” (Kalantaryan and 
Martin, 2015). The objective of a harmonised EU-wide scheme facilitating intra-EU mobility could be 
reached by reducing the discretion in the implementation of the Directive (addressing the 
related/problematic flaws), with more clarity for applicants and employers. This would mean 
expanding the rights attached, hence, making the scheme more visible and competitive.  
Enhancing intra-EU mobility 
The lack of intra-EU mobility (one of the crucial drawbacks of the current Blue Card) is related to the 
deviation from the original idea of creating an umbrella work permit for the whole EU (see point 25 of 
the Preamble of the Directive). The Blue Card as a single permit allowing for free movement and the 
right of establishment within the EU labour market would become an instrument for highly-skilled EU 
labour migration and would excel any single national scheme (without the need to abolish them). The 
proposal foresees enhancing the intra-EU mobility of Blue Card holders by allowing them to carry out 
short business trips (up to 90 days) within the Member States without having to obtain additional 
authorisation. Instead, while moving to another Member State for highly skilled employment, the EU 
Blue Card holders will still have to apply for a new EU Blue Card while profiting from certain 
facilitations. First, it will give the right to move to another Member State after 12 months of residence 
in the first Member State (instead of the current 18 month stay) and six months in the second, third etc. 
Second, if the profession is not regulated in the Member State, the Blue Card holder does not have to 
prove his/her eligibility regarding sufficient qualifications (education or experience) once it is proven 
in the first Member State. The proposed simplifications enhance the intra-EU mobility potential of the 
Blue Card, but still leaves it far from the initial idea of “one umbrella work permit for the whole EU”. 
A valid alternative to what is the Proposal offer would be automatic access to the labour market of 
other Member States (perhaps limiting it to highly-skilled occupations and jobs above a salary 
threshold) after a qualifying period would be a way to guarantee intra-EU mobility to the beneficiaries 
of the Blue Card and the only way to grant “equal social and economic rights as nationals of the host 
Member State” (point 7 of the Preamble of the 2009 Directive). 
Revisions in the Blue Card Directive: Reforms, Constraints and Gaps 
European University Institute 9 
Reducing the costs of benefitting from the Blue Card  
The high cost of benefitting from the Blue Card in the current Directive has been limiting its use to a 
very small group of potential beneficiaries. The strict definition of “highly qualified employment9”, 
high (and non-differentiated across occupations, sectors and regions) salary threshold (minimum of 1.5 
the average national salary) along with the minimum duration of the offered contact of one year made 
it accessible to only a small segment of labour market (such as multinational companies). According to 
Kalantaryan and Martin (2015), the existing eligibility criteria undermine its effectiveness as a labour 
migration tool (in particular, for small and medium enterprises), penalize those sectors with lower than 
average salaries in the economy. The Proposal addresses these issues in several ways. 
 Reducing bureaucratic obstacles. The Blue Card related procedures are extremely costly for 
all stakeholders. It is “costly” both for the applicant through cumbersome bureaucracy and for 
the national authorities as currently the procedure requires case-by-case processing. A 
framework allowing certified employers or trusted partners to go through fast track procedures 
would reduce the bureaucratic obstacles for the applicants and the processing costs for 
administrators (Kalantaryan and Martin, 2015). In the revised version the application processing 
time is shortened from a maximum of 90 to 60 days. In addition, the Member States can 
“introduce a special fast-track procedure for recognised or trusted employers fulfilling certain 
criteria, who will profit from an even speedier procedure with fewer conditions for the employee 
to fulfil to reduce administrative burdens”10. 
 Shortening the minimum length of the contract. The Proposal suggests reducing it from the 
current 12 to six months. This would allow the employer to offer a short contact (a 
minimum of six months) with the possibility of extension if the candidate is suitable 
for the position offered. 
 Lowering the salary threshold. The average national salary and 1.4 of it are proposed as the 
lower and higher bounds of the salary threshold (instead of current 1.5). A lower salary threshold 
(80 % of the regular one) will also be offered for two categories: recent graduate professionals; 
and workers in occupations experiencing labour shortages. This is in line with the position of 
the European Parliament expressed in the Report in the section On revision of the Blue Card 
(133): “ It is clear that the directive should focus not just on the highly-qualified, but also on 
targeted high-qualification occupations where there are proven labour shortages”. Offering a 
lower salary threshold to the first group, who might struggle to find a job meeting the salary 
threshold requirement upon graduation, would help to retain foreign graduates after they 
complete their studies in Europe and facilitate the entry of young talents from abroad. These 
measures will increase the pool of potential beneficiaries. However, the national average salary 
is not especially sensitive to the wage dynamics of a given sector. The threshold to be 
established, though lower, still does not take into account factors defining the salary for a 
particular job (occupation, sectors, region etc.). It, thus, leaves out many potential highly-skilled 
foreign workers. The established threshold should not be unique for the whole national labour 
market, but rather it needs to relate to the salary achieved through collective bargaining or the 
average salary in a given sector/region/occupation. This would also guarantee that, on the one 
hand, labour immigration does not undermine national work conditions and salaries, and, on the 
other hand, would become a flexible tool for adapting to the different needs of national labour 
markets. Taking into account the regional differences in wages it would make the periphery 
attractive for highly-skilled foreign workers too. This would, hence, contribute to a more even 
distribution of migrants across the national territory.  
                                                     
9
 According to the Directive 2009/50/EC highly-qualified employment means the employment of a person who is 
employed under national law, (ii) paid and has the required adequate and specific competence, as proven by higher 
professional qualifications. 
10
 Press release http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2071_en.htm?locale=FR 
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Introducing flexible and targeted definition of “highly-qualified” 
In the Proposal the concept of “highly qualified employment” is now replaced by “highly skilled 
employment”. Also, though keeping the level of required skills (higher professional qualifications11) 
unchanged, the Proposal would make it mandatory for all Member States to recognise professional 
experiences as an alternative to education qualifications. This, by definition, will extend the pool of 
potential beneficiaries of the Blue Card, and will partially address the bureaucratic obstacles related to 
the recognition of foreign formal qualifications. 
Enhancing Blue Card rights 
In order to make the Blue Card more attractive right attached to it should be enhanced. The absence of 
a family migration framework (unlike, for example, Canada where family members can migrate 
together with the principal applicant) makes the beneficiaries go through a family unification 
procedure, which is frequently long or / and bureaucratically challenging. One way to increase the 
competitiveness of the Blue Card (with respect to national schemes and also at the international level) 
is to ensure that family members can join the EU Blue Card holder simultaneously. The Proposal 
addresses the attractiveness (and international competitiveness) issues considering: (i) simultaneous 
family unification; and (ii) introduction of accelerated access to permanent residence. Under new rules 
the Blue Card beneficiary becomes eligible for long-term EU residence after three year continuous 
residence in one Member State, or five years in different Member States. As attracting highly skilled 
foreign workers is a long-term priority for the EU then the period for which the Blue Card is issued 
should be extended to five years. This would entitle beneficiaries to a permanent residence according 
to EU legislation (Kalantaryan and Martin 2015). Alternatively, shortening the period of stay before 
entitlement for permanent residence might be shortened or the stay could be opened up to include 
more than a single Member State.  
Though the Blue Card is a demand-driven scheme, it is not designed to incentivise the employers to 
hire highly-skilled TCNs. Rather, it is supposed to attract and retain them to address shortages in the 
labour market. However, the opinions of the (potential) Blue Card beneficiaries (for example, 
regarding factors defining the choice/preferences between the Blue Card and national schemes) were 
not taken into consideration in the reforms. They were not reflected either in the impact assessment 
report, or in the Proposal itself
12
. For instance, one of the desired characteristics of the Blue Card from 
the beneficiary’s prospective is the independence to choose an employer after the qualifying period. 
This is, however, jeopardised by the way that the directive is transposed in national law. The original 
Council Directive states that that Member States are free to decide whether the application for an EU 
Blue Card is to be made by the third-country national and/or his/her employer. However, if a Member 
State states that the application can only be made by the employer it gives the employer additional 
bargaining power and the possibility of limiting the opportunities of the employee to look for another 
job in the future, something which contradicts the initial aim of the Blue Card. For instance, this is the 
case in Italy where the employer alone can initiate a Blue Card application. 
Expanding the scope/coverage 
The proposed reform considers including the highly-skilled beneficiaries of international protection 
(under Directive 2011/95/EU) in the Blue Card scheme. According to the Proposal, this would enable 
                                                     
11
 “Higher professional qualifications” can be attested either by “higher education qualifications” (at least level 6 of ISCED 
2011 or level 6 of the European Qualification Framework) or by “higher professional skills” (at least three years of 
relevant professional experience of a level comparable to higher education). 
12
 The only exception is the opinion regarding the possibility of intra-EU mobility based on surveys conducted among Blue 
Card holders in Germany summarised in the Impact assessment report. (page 8): “The views of Blue Card holders 
themselves may illustrate the need best: 87 % of 4 116 German Blue Card holders who were surveyed see clear benefits 
in improved mobility within the EU and 13 % say that they have already or will probably make use of it”. 
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them to take up employment in a more targeted way in accordance with their skills and education 
hence, facilitate faster integration in the labour market. This approach is not new: it is already 
practiced in France; if an asylum seeker fulfils the conditions for applying for the EC Blue Card 
his/her application will be processed through the relevant regulation with no labour-market test (EMN, 
2015). One possible drawback of extending the Blue Card to the beneficiaries of international 
protection is that it might lead to brain drain in the countries of first asylum (especially on the EU 
periphery). This would result in a deterioration of the remaining stock of beneficiaries of international 
protection in terms of skills, making the task of integrating them into the labour market more 
challenging. Given the relatively low skill level of the beneficiaries of international protection it would 
be more effective to extend the Seasonal Workers Directive to beneficiaries of international 
protection
13
. This would mean greater economic and social impact in terms of: (i) introducing potential 
beneficiaries to the labour market of the host countries (hence, fostering their integration); (ii) 
combating labour shortages for seasonal jobs (excluding the risks of overstay), while contributing 
fiscally.  
One of the clauses (131) of the Report recalls that in the Agenda on Migration, the Commission 
announced its intention to revise the ‘Blue Card Directive’, looking particularly at the issues of scope: 
possibly covering entrepreneurs willing to invest in Europe. Indeed, this was one of the parallel 
legislative options considered and retained for in-depth assessment. However, it is not included in the 
preferred option, and hence is not discussed in the Proposal. The Blue Card will remain a scheme for 
workers with an employment contract, as the details of the scheme are tailored for that group alone. 
However, this does not exclude the necessity of creating a framework which would allow foreign 
entrepreneurs willing to invest in the European Union. Perhaps, the Blue Card is not the best tool to 
attract potential entrepreneurs, as it is designed for attracting highly-skilled individuals whose 
potential is verified through formal higher education qualifications (or, potentially, equivalent 
professional experience), occupation category, salary. The set of skills necessary and hence the 
eligibility criteria to be established for entrepreneurial activities are different: credit history, validity of 
the business plan, previous entrepreneurial experience, established contacts in the destination, etc. An 
example of an entrepreneurial activity visa is offered by Canada. According to the information 
provided by the Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Start-up Visa Program, introduced in April 
2013, targets immigrant entrepreneurs with the skills and potential to build innovative businesses in 
Canada, businesses that can create jobs for Canadians and compete on a global scale
14
. Additionally, 
the Province of Quebec is in charge of its own business immigration program. 
The set of reforms presented in the Proposal though necessary (if approved), are unlikely to enable 
the Blue Card to address labour-market shortages even in the near future. The estimated number of 
highly-skilled workers that will be attracted according to estimates (from 32,484 to 137,690) is below 
the desired level. By 2020, the expected number of unfilled vacancies for ICT and highly-skilled 
health sector processionals will be respectively 756,000 (130,000 per year) and 1 million (200,000 per 
year)
15
. Hence, the number of highly-skilled workers attracted, even in the best case scenario, can 
hardly cover the needs of one of these two sectors. These figures indicate that the Proposal is simply 
not ambitious enough in meeting EU labour-market needs. 
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 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and 
stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF /?uri=CELEX:32014L0036&from=en . 
14
 The program replaced the federal Immigrant Investor Program (IIP) and federal Entrepreneur (EN) Program that were 
proved to provide limited economic benefits to Canada. Studies document modest income generation, limited to 
entrepreneurial endeavour by business immigrants (Ley 2003; 2006). 
15
 European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM(201) 192 final; Husing, T., Korte, W.B., 
Dashja, E., e-Skills in Europe: Trends and Forecasts for the European ICT Professional and Digital Leadership Labour 
Markets (2015-2020), Empirica Working Paper, November 2015.  
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Table 2 Comparison of reforms proposed by academic literature, the European Parliament and 
the Proposal by the European Commission regarding the Blue Card Directive. 
Reforms proposed in the literature  Reforms suggested by 
the EP  
Reforms suggested in the EC 
Proposal 
Reducing the level of heterogeneity 
 introducing more transparent, 
comprehensive and widely 
available information on the 
conditions for benefitting from a 
Blue Card in each MS. 
 coexistence of EU Blue Card 
and national labour migration 
schemes (national schemes are 
more flexible to respond national 
and dynamic in meeting the needs 
of national labour markets).  
 removing the parallel 
national schemes. 
 removing the parallel national 
schemes (establishing a single EU-
wide scheme). 
Enhancing intra-EU mobility 
 giving access to the whole EU 
labour market (a single permit 
allowing for free movement within 
the EU labour market). 
 granting access to the labour 
market of other MS after a 
qualifying period of 1 year 
(instead of current 2).  
 removing the administrative 
procedures related to moving to a 
second MS to take up highly-
skilled employment. 
  allowing for shorter business 
trips of up to 90 days within the 
MS. 
 facilitating procedures related to 
moving to a second MS to take up 
highly-skilled employment. 
 reduction of required residence in 
the first MS (from 18 to 12 for the 
first state, 6 for the second, third 
etc.) 
  removing the requirement to 
prove the sufficiency of 
qualifications (education or 
experience) in the new MS for non-
regulated professions once approved 
in the first MS.  
Reducing the costs of benefitting from the Blue Card 
 lowering the established salary 
threshold 
 defining the threshold based on 
collective bargaining or average 
salary applicable in each 
sector/occupation. 
 also targeting high-
qualification 
occupations where there 
are proven labour 
shortages 
 lowering the salary threshold 
by creating a flexible range 
corresponding to the MS’s labour 
markets contexts 
 lowering salary threshold 
offered to recently graduated 
professionals and workers in 
shortage occupations. 
 shortening the minimum length 
of the contract from 12 to six 
months. 
 shortening the maximum 
processing time (from 90 to 60 
days) 
 introducing a special fast-track 
procedure for recognised or trusted 
employers. 
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Introducing flexible and targeted definition of “highly-qualified” 
 integrating specialized 
professionals in highly sought-after 
occupations 
  introducing equivalence between 
professional experience and formal 
qualifications 
Enhancing rights attached to the Blue Card. 
 ensuring simultaneous 
unification with family members 
  extending the maximum period 
for granting the Blue Card to five 
years (to make holders eligible for 
a permanent residence permit) 
  allowing for accelerated access 
to permanent residence status (3 in 1 
MS or 5 in different MSs.) 
 allowing immediate and more 
flexible labour-market access 
 ensuring simultaneous 
reunification with family members. 
Expanding the scope/coverage  
 including entrepreneurs 
 including family migrants 
 including asylum-seekers and 
beneficiaries of international 
protection. 
 covering 
entrepreneurs willing to 
invest in Europe. 
 highly-skilled beneficiaries of 
international protection will be able 
to apply for the Blue Card 
 restricting the Blue Card to 
workers with an employment 
contract. 
Attracting talent to the European Union? Economic and cultural constraints 
There are several economic and cultural constraints that should be taken into account while designing 
policies to attract and retain highly-skilled migrants: ignoring these constraints might seriously 
undermine the effectiveness of the instruments put in place.  
Language diversity  
One of the biggest cultural assets of the European Union – the diversity of languages spoken – is an 
obstacle for attracting highly-skilled foreign workers. It is among the biggest barriers for intra-EU 
mobility for both EU citizens and TCNs, as moving to another member state might result in 
employment in an occupation not corresponding to a migrant’s qualifications.  
The crucial role played by language in attracting talents can be observed in the labour-market 
related global market for tertiary-level students. Out of ten top destinations for tertiary-level 
international students four are English-speaking countries that together receive almost 40 percent of 
total mobile students: the USA (19%), the UK (10%), Australia (6%), and Canada (3%). Among 
European countries the UK alone attracts 10 percent of tertiary level international students. France, 
Germany and Italy attract respectively only 6%, 5% and 2%: though all make it into the top ten. The 
importance of a common language works for France, which is chosen as a study destination by 
French-speaking Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian students. 
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Table 3 Top 5 destination countries for tertiary-level international students  
Destination  Percentage of total 
mobile students 
Total number of mobile 
students hosted  
Top 5 origins  
the USA  19 % 842,384 China 260,914; India 97,613; Korea Rep. 
64,693; Saudi Arabia 50,262; Canada 26,909 
United 
Kingdom  
10 % 428,724 China 86,204; India 19,604; Nigeria 17,973; 
Malaysia 15,583; the USA 14,950  
Australia 6 % 266,048 China 90,245; India 25,562; Malaysia 15,357; 
Vietnam 12,898; Indonesia 9.495 
France 6 % 235,123 China 25,388; Morocco 25,233; Algeria 
16,558; Tunisia 8,955;Senegal 7,439;  
Germany 5 % 210,542 China 19,441; Russia 9,480; Austria, 8.277; 
Bulgaria 6,186; Poland 5772. 
Source: UNESCO, Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students. 
Skill mismatch and over-qualification  
There is a popular belief that migrants are less educated than natives, which is, however, not 
confirmed by the evidence provided by official statistics. Figure 4 demonstrates that there are 
important differences across select EU member states and traditional destinations in terms of the skill 
level distribution among both migrants and natives.  
Figure 4 Percentage of the highly-educated among native- and foreign-born 15-64 year-olds not 
in education, 2012-2013 
 
Source: Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In, OECD 2015.  
In the traditional destinations migrants are, with the exception of the USA, more educated than 
natives. The highest percentage of tertiary-educated is in Canada; it is more than 60 percent. In the 
EU, on average, migrants are as educated as natives; for both groups the share of tertiary educated is 
about 26 percent. Migrants are more educated than natives in the UK, Ireland, Hungary, and Poland. 
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In Italy they are among the least educated (11.1 %); however the natives themselves have only 15.1 % 
tertiary educated
16
.  
Figure 5: Percentage of the highly-educated among native- and foreign-born 15-64, 2015  
Source: Eurostat, Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and country of birth (%) [edat_lfs_9912] 
Note: For Germany migrants defined based on nationality, not on country of birth. Individuals with education 
corresponding to ISCED2011 (5-8) are considered as highly educated. 
Figure 5 demonstrates that on average EU born migrants are better educated than those born in third 
countries. TCNs are better educated than the natives in the UK, Ireland and Hungary. However, better 
education does not necessarily translate into better occupations. It is not enough to attract highly-
skilled migrants, as admission alone does not guarantee a utilisation of those skills at destination. 
Migrants frequently end up working in occupations not corresponding to their qualification and skills. 
The extent of skill-occupation mismatch for highly–skilled migrants is usually measured by 
overqualification rate: the share of workers holding a higher qualification than the job requires
17
. 
Figure 6 presents the relevant information for select EU member states as well as for traditional 
destinations.  
An employed person is defined as being overqualified if he/she has a tertiary degree but if he/she is 
not working in a job that is ISCO-level 1-3; i.e. neither classifies as a manager nor as a 
professional/associate professional occupation.  
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 The presented figures refer to the total foreign-born population including those born either in another EU member state or 
outside of the EU. There are important differences in terms of the level of education between EU born migrants and non-
EU born migrants within and between member states. 
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 An employed person is defined as being overqualified if he/she has a tertiary degree, but is not working in a job that is 
ISCO-level 1-3; i.e. neither classifies as a manager, nor as a professional/associate professional occupation (EU and 
OECD, 2015).  
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Figure 6 Overqualification rates among 15-64 year-olds who are not in education, by place of 
birth, 2012-13 
 
Source: Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In, OECD 2015.  
Note: The figures are based on EU-LFS 2012-13. United States: Current Population Survey (CPS) 2012-13. 
Australian Survey of Education and Work (ASEW) 2013. Canada and New Zealand: LFSs 2012-13.  
With the exception of New Zealand, migrants are more exposed to overqualification than natives in all 
countries included in the table. Italy and Spain demonstrate the highest rates for migrants among the 
EU member states present there. These countries scored poorly both in terms of attracting the highly-
skilled and in terms of utilising their skills. The overqualification rates for the foreign-born population 
in the USA and Canada are higher, on average, than in Europe. Overqualification for migrants is the 
highest in Canada. These figures indicate that though the country is successful in attracting highly-
skilled through its points system, the highly-skilled are not necessarily employed in occupations 
corresponding to their qualifications.  
Ideally, migration should lead to a win-win-win situation, which provides benefits to the host 
country, the country of origin and, of course, to the migrants themselves. Destination countries fill 
labour shortage, migrants benefit from the better pay for their skills and origin countries benefit 
though remittances and the inflow of new skills that return migrants bring upon return. This is 
particularly relevant for the highly-skilled migrants due to their rich human capital. However, the 
reality seems to be far different from this. Migrants are frequently highly overqualified, which leads to 
a situation when brain gain becomes brain waste, through deskilling and devaluation of previous 
learning and work experience. There are several reasons explaining high overqualification rates which 
signals obstacles to the full utilisation of migrants’ human capital. First, mismatch between the skill 
shortages in the destination and the skills of arriving migrants. In other words, the skills or formal 
qualifications migrants possess are not relevant or demanded in the destination. Second, lack of 
mechanisms in place enabling cross border transfer of skills (such as mutual recognition of 
qualification). In this case migrants have either to go through the education system of the country of 
origin or to be employed in a position which does not correspond to his/her qualifications. The first 
option is usually costly both in terms of money and time and as migrants often cannot afford it they 
end up being employed in an occupation which does not require any formal qualification. Last, but not 
least, possible discrimination in the labour market (such as the “glass ceiling”) is a possible cause of 
the waste of talents.  
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Absence of a common framework on formal qualification recognition 
Labour migration is related to a number of bureaucratic procedures such as verification of identity 
documents, validation of employment contacts, issuing a work permit etc. For (highly)-skilled labour 
migrants the procedures might be even more complicated. After all, to prove their formal 
qualifications and skills (and hence to benefit from them at destination) they have to go through 
intense administrative procedures related to translation and legal endorsement of diplomas and 
certificates which take both time and money. The imperfect transferability of foreign qualifications is 
among the major causes of human capital underutilisation, with its negative consequences for all 
parties involved: countries of origin, destination and migrants themselves.  
The problem is specific to all destinations countries. However, migrants choosing the EU as a 
destination encounter additional obstacles related to the absence of a unique EU wide framework and 
low level of harmonisation of procedures related to the recognition of foreign qualifications and skills 
across member states. According to OECD and EU (2016), there is, currently, no automatic 
recognition of academic or professional qualifications, even within the EU, and each Member State 
applies its own rules. Instead, there is a framework that guarantees the right to request recognition, as 
well as the conditions for this process
18
. Once that foreign qualifications are recognised in the Member 
State of residence, third-country nationals can benefit from equal treatment in recognition procedures. 
However, the evidence of formal qualifications issued by a third country shall be regarded as evidence 
of formal qualifications if the holder has three years professional experience in the profession 
concerned on the territory of the Member State which recognised that evidence of formal 
qualifications certified by that Member State. “In each EU Member State the various rules and 
procedures applying to the recognition of foreign professional qualifications make up a complex and 
disparate web of practices rather than a homogeneous corpus. Procedures differ depending on the 
occupational field, the scope of practice, and the regulated or un-regulated status of the profession for 
which recognition is sought. Moreover, authority over recognition is generally highly fragmented—
with numerous public and private stakeholders involved in the process. These are not characteristics 
singular to EU Member States.” (MPI Europe, 2015). This jeopardises the potential intra-EU mobility 
of highly-skilled third-country workers. It also undermines the attractiveness of the EU labour market 
for foreign highly-skilled workers who might prefer destinations (such as the US, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand) where their qualifications once recognised are valid through the whole territory. 
The presented discussion suggests that the creation of an effective and efficient EU-wide 
framework enabling recognition of foreign formal qualifications is a necessary condition for attracting 
highly-skilled professionals to the EU. Recent active collaboration of the European Network of 
Information Centres in the European Region (ENICs) and the National Academic Recognition 
Information Centres in the European Union (NARICs) with third countries is an important step 
towards the goal. Also, significant progress has been made towards academic recognition of foreign 
qualifications. The 2016 the European Recognition Manual for Higher Education Institutions has been 
developed to assist and enable credential evaluators and admissions officers in higher education 
institutions to practise fair recognition according to the principles of the Lisbon Recognition 
Convention
19
. However, this advancement refers mainly to recognition for the purpose of obtaining 
access to higher education. 
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 The need to establish a common European framework for mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and evidence of 
formal qualification were discussed in Article 47(1) of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the relevant Recognition Directive 
(2005 2005/36/EC) was adopted by the European Parliament and of the Council on 7 September 2005. Available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT /?uri=celex%3A32005L0036. 
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Sona Kalantaryan 
18 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
Glass ceiling/glass door  
Skilled migrants are among the most desired in destination countries due to the human capital they 
bring with them. However, many of them do not succeed in working in occupations corresponding to 
their qualifications, partially due to the lack of recognition, and partially due to the so-called “glass 
ceiling” or ‘’glass doors”: intangible barrier within a hierarchy that prevent migrants from getting 
upper level jobs despite their qualifications. According to Brandi (2001) 40 percent of highly-skilled 
migrants from Asia, Africa and Latin America in Rome work in low-skilled jobs. The author suggests 
that there is evidence of various kinds of glass ceilings in the workplace, compounded by a type of 
differential racism which seems to privilege some migrants over others. Andersson and Fejes (2010) 
and Morrice (2013) describe career advancement related difficulties encountered by highly-qualified 
refugees in, respectively, Sweden and the UK. These phenomena are well documented by scholars for 
traditional destinations (see, for example, Pendakur and Woodcock 2010; Wagner and Childs 2006). 
For example, Guo (2013) describing the situation in Canada states that many migrants suffer from 
unemployment and underemployment, poor economic performance, and downward social mobility, 
which can be attributed to a “triple glass effect” consisting of a “glass gate”, “glass door”, and “glass 
ceiling’’. The first one denies immigrants’ entrance to guarded professional communities, the second 
one blocks immigrants’ access to professional employment at high-wage firms and the third one 
prevents immigrants from moving up to management positions because of their ethnic and cultural 
background. Wagner and Childs (2006) find that even those possessing the most demanded skills 
encounter difficulties in gaining access to jobs corresponding to their qualifications: migrant 
optometrists become taxi drivers, teachers become clerical assistants, and environmental engineers 
stack supermarkets shelves. 
In the inequality literature, discrimination might affect workers so that they face constraints to 
reaching the highest wage positions, something which is referred to as hitting the glass ceiling. In a 
similar way, workers might face unequal access to firms which, on average, pay higher salaries, 
something which can be seen as hitting the glass door (Pendakur and Woodcock, 2010). 
Relatively low wage premium 
Europe continues to be characterised by progressive income taxes in combination with a generous 
support system for families and individuals, which results in a relatively egalitarian system. However, 
a skilled migrant would search for a destination that pays the best for his or her qualifications. Wage 
premium is among the important factors he/she considers while choosing that destination. Table 5 
demonstrates that the relative earnings of tertiary educated in the EU member states are as high as (or 
higher than) in other traditional destinations. However, the mean monthly earnings are significantly 
lower. Only seven among the twenty-one reported member states have wages higher than in Australia, 
only one (Germany) higher than Canada and none higher than in the USA.  
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Table 5 Relative and monthly earnings of tertiary educated workers  
 
Relative earnings of workers 
by age group  
Mean monthly earnings of workers, by PIAAC 
literacy proficiency level  
25-64 25-34 55-64 Level 0/1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4/5 
Austria 171 138 173 X 4166 4798 5176 
Belgium  128 123 135 
    Belgium (Flanders) 
   
X 4161 4505 4911 
Czech Republic 176 149 187 X 1899 2193 2291 
Denmark 128 112 137 3834 4279 5012 5367 
Estonia 134 116 147 1459 1771 2055 2496 
Finland 147 126 166 X 3435 3833 3889 
France 154 138 189 2762 3113 3299 3604 
Germany 174 148 207 3750 4074 4985 5649 
Greece 152 127 187 
    Hungary 208 181 222 
    Ireland 175 165 162 3690 4027 4835 5239 
Italy 147 125 167 X 3132 3589 3650 
Luxembourg 168 148 184 
    Netherlands 156 137 159 X 4476 5004 5140 
Poland 172 146 205 1798 1947 2208 2422 
Portugal 170 156 193 
    Slovak Republic 173 144 190 X 1889 2325 2765 
Slovenia 180 142 211 
    Spain 141 127 150 2722 3088 3251 3685 
Sweden 128 110 143 2807 3235 3746 3923 
United Kingdom 156 149 159 
    UK (England./N. Ireland) 
   
2706 3708 4515 5317 
EU21 average 159 138 175 
    OECD average 159 140 176 
    Switzerland 158 134 169 
    United States 174 165 172 4180 4983 5956 7366 
Australia 134 119 149 2660 3177 3941 4611 
Canada 139 123 149 3325 3903 4774 5368 
New Zealand 123 121 123 
    Japan 152 136 177 X 3255 3739 4174 
Norway 130 108 154 3707 4549 5088 5267 
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2014  
Note: Relative earnings of workers are compared with those having upper secondary education (= 100). Mean 
monthly earnings of workers, by PIAAC literacy proficiency 25-64 year-olds with income from employment 
working full time (i.e. 30 or more hours per week), in equivalent USD converted using PPPs for private 
consumption. 
Absence of an EU-wide framework regulating social security access for TCNs 
According to the EMN (2014) existing bilateral social security agreements reached by Member States 
with third-countries have created significant exceptions to national rules governing access to social 
security rights for third-country nationals in EU Member States. The result is a significant variation in 
the social security rights that third-country nationals enjoy both across Member States and often within 
individual Member States. Due to the large number of bilateral agreements concluded with third 
countries by individual member states there are wide variations in terms of benefits or benefit 
categories covered. These bilateral agreements mostly cover contributory or partially contributory 
benefits such as old-age benefits and healthcare. Though the majority of bilateral agreements grant 
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equal treatment between third-country nationals and nationals with regard to the social security rights 
identified in the agreement, the material scope of the equal treatment principle is not always the same 
in all bilateral agreements signed by a Member State (EMN, 2014). The export of benefits 
(contributory or partially contributory) to third countries is a part of all bilateral agreements. However, 
the conditions vary significantly, the related administrative procedures are complicated and vary from 
one member state to another, and if a migrant worked in several member states he/she has to go 
through bureaucratic procedures in each member state separately. This makes the overall possibility of 
exporting benefits to third countries an exception rather than a rule. 
Conclusion  
The refugee crisis is constantly and overwhelmingly present in the headlines of European newspapers 
and on the agenda of policy makers with its emergencies and the demand for urgent solutions. 
However, during the last decade policy makers at the EU level have also been taking steps towards 
creating a migration management framework, ensuring that regular migration becomes the main 
channel of migration towards Europe. Creating a pan European scheme to attract and retain highly-
qualified third-country nationals, facilitating their admission and mobility across the EU was one of 
the identified priorities which was reified into action by adoption of the Blue Card Directive by the 
Council of Europe in 2009. Unfortunately, the scheme has been proven to be ineffective and has been 
heavily criticised by both policy maker and the academic community. As a consequence, the European 
Agenda on Migration presented by the European Commission among its key actions related to the 
fourth pillar – a new policy on legal migration – considers “modernisation and overhaul of the Blue 
Card scheme”. The document acknowledges the weakness of the Blue Card in its current form as a 
tool to attract and retain talents in Europe and reconfirms the need to undertake reforms in the field. 
The followed public consultation launched by the European Commission aimed at searching for 
possible strategies to review the framework in order to make it more effective. In June 2016 the 
European Commission presented a new Proposal to reform the Blue Card Directive to improve its 
effectiveness in attracting and retaining talents. The study discusses the proposed reform in terms of its 
potential to address present shortcomings, constraints and any remaining gaps. 
The new Proposal takes into account most identified weaknesses by: reducing the level of 
heterogeneity of transposition of the Blue Cards across EU Member States; enhancing intra-EU 
mobility; lowering the costs of benefitting from the Blue Card; and reducing bureaucratic obstacles 
and enhancing rights attached to the Blue Card. Still there are several remaining gaps worth 
mentioning.  
First, the Proposal foresees abolishing the national schemes for the reduction of the present 
heterogeneity, while this goal could be reached by reducing discretion in the implementation of the 
Directive. Moreover, expanding the rights attached (e.g. a single permit allowing for free movement 
and the right of establishment within the EU labour market) would excel any single national scheme 
without the need to abolish them. Second, though the Proposal considers enhancing intra-EU mobility 
potential for the Blue Card, it still remains far from the initial idea of “one umbrella work permit for 
the whole EU”. Third, the proposed lower salary threshold is an important step towards widening the 
pool of potential beneficiaries. However, a unique threshold (even with exceptions made for 
occupations with proven labour shortages and recent graduates) does not take into account factors 
defining the salary for a particular job (occupation, sectors, region etc). It hence leaves out many 
potential highly-skilled foreign workers. Finally, the set of reforms presented in the Proposal though 
necessary (if approved), are unlikely to enable the Blue Card to address labour-market shortages even 
in the near future as the estimated number of high skilled workers to be attracted is below the desired 
level. As already discussed in the study the number of highly–skilled workers attracted in the best case 
scenario can hardly cover the needs of one sector. In other terms the Proposal is simply not ambitious 
enough to meet the needs of the EU labour market. Moreover, the numerous objective obstacles such 
as linguistic heterogeneity, absence of a common framework on formal qualification recognition, 
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relatively low wage premium and the absence of an EU-wide framework regulating social security 
access for third-country nationals are and will continue to jeopardise the competitive potential of the 
European Union in the market for internationally mobile talents. One way to make the European 
Union more open for highly-skilled third country nationals would be a scheme allowing more effective 
job matching, possibly by providing highly-skilled third-country nationals with job search visas at 
least for sectors and occupations with proven labour shortages. 
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